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Second-Order Perfectionism 
 
Cass R. Sunstein* 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In constitutional law, first-order perfectionism represents an effort 
to cast the Constitution’s ideals in the best constructive light. Ronald 
Dworkin’s conception of law as “integrity” can be seen as a form of first-
order perfectionism. By contrast, second-order perfectionism attempts to 
set out an account of constitutional adjudication that is sensitive to the 
fallibility of federal judges. Originalism is best defended as a form of 
second-order perfectionism; the same can be said of Thayerism, captured 
in the view that judges should uphold statutes unless they are 
unquestionably violative of the Constitution. Minimalism, which calls for 
narrow, incompletely theorized judgments, is another form of second-
order perfectionism. Whether first-order perfectionism is best, and what 
kind of second-order perfectionism might be chosen instead, cannot be 
decided without an appreciation of the characteristics of relevant 
institutions. Under certain institutional assumptions, originalism is 
preferable; under other assumptions, first-order perfectionism, Thayerism, 
or minimalism may be the right approach. Freestanding normative 
assessments are also inescapable. For example, originalism cannot be 
evaluated without some kind of assessment of the results that it would 
produce. These claims have implications for first-order perfectionism of 
the sort defended by Dworkin and more recently by James Fleming. 
 
                                                 
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department of Political Science, 
University of Chicago. This essay is prepared for a symposium at Fordham Law School on James Fleming, 
Securing Constitutional Democracy (2006), and Cass R. Sunstein, Radicals in Robes (2006). I am grateful 
to Abner Greene and Brian Leiter for valuable comments on a previous draft. 
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I. Thayerville, Bergerton, and Other Places 
 
 No approach to constitutional interpretation makes sense in every possible world. 
The argument for any particular approach must depend, in part, on a set of judgments 
about institutional capacities.1 
 Consider the view, associated with James Bradley Thayer, that courts should 
uphold legislation unless it is plainly in violation of the Constitution.2 Few people accept 
this position today. But imagine a society—let us call it Thayerville—in which 
democratic processes work exceedingly fairly and well, so that judicial intervention is 
almost never required from the standpoint of anything that really matters. In Thayerville, 
racial segregation does not occur; political speech is not banned; the legitimate claims of 
religious minorities and property holders are respected; the systems of federalism and 
separation of powers are safeguarded, and precisely to the right extent, by democratic 
institutions. Imagine too that in Thayerville, judicial judgments are highly unreliable. For 
example, judges make systematic blunders, from the standpoint of political morality, 
when they attempt to give content to constitutional terms such as “equal protection of the 
laws” and “due process of law.” In such a society, a Thayerian approach to the 
Constitution would make a great deal of sense, and judges should be persuaded to adopt 
it.3 
 Or consider originalism: the view that the Constitution should be construed to fit 
with the original public meaning of the document.4 Imagine a society—let us call it 
Bergerton5—in which the original public meaning is quite excellent, in the sense that it 
ensures well-functioning institutions and protects a robust set of rights, in a way that fits 
with a reasonable account of both democracy and autonomy. Imagine that in Bergerton, 
                                                 
1 An illuminating and vigorous argument to this effect can be found in Adrian Vermeule, Judging 
Under Uncertainty (2005). 
2 See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 
Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893) 
3 I put to one side the evident fact that Thayerism is not a complete account of constitutional 
interpretation. We might agree that courts should strike down statutes only when the violation of the 
Constitution is clear; but how do we know when the violation is clear? To work, Thayerism needs to be 
supplemented by some kind of account of constitutional meaning. 
4 Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). 
5 See Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary (1977). Berger is concerned with original intentions, 
rather than original meaning, but for present purposes we can put that disagreement to one side, as a within-
the-family issue in Bergerton. 
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the democratic process is also very fair and good, in part because of the excellence of the 
Constitution, and that it is entirely able to make up for any inadequacies in the founding 
document. Suppose finally that in Bergerton, judges, unleashed from the original public 
meaning, would do a great deal of harm, unsettling well-functioning institutions and 
recognizing, as rights, interests that do not deserve that recognition. In such a society, an 
originalist approach to constitutional interpretation would seem best. 
 Or consider minimalism: the view that judges should take narrow, theoretically 
unambitious steps, at least when they lack the experience or the information to rule 
broadly or ambitiously.6 Imagine a society—it happens to be called Smallville—in which 
the original public meaning of the Constitution is not so excellent, in the sense that it 
does not adequately protect rights. Imagine that in Smallville, the democratic process is 
good but not great, in the sense that it sometimes produces, or permits, significant 
injustices. Suppose finally that in Smallville, judges will do poorly if they strike out on 
their own, but very well if they build modestly on their own precedents, following 
something like the common law method. In such a society, a minimalist approach to the 
Constitution would have a lot to be said for it.7 
 Or consider perfectionism: the view that the Constitution should be construed in a 
way that makes it best, and in that sense perfects it.8 Imagine a society—proudly called 
Olympus—in which the original public meaning of the document does not adequately 
protect rights, properly understood. Imagine that the text is general enough to be read to 
provide that protection. Imagine finally that Olympian courts, loosened from Thayerian 
strictures, or from the original understanding, or from minimalism, would generate a far 
better account of rights and institutions, creating the preconditions for both democracy 
and autonomy. In Olympus, a perfectionist approach to the Constitution would be entirely 
appropriate. 
 Is any one of these approaches ruled off the table by the Constitution itself? If the 
founding document set out the rules for its own interpretation, judges would be bound by 
                                                 
6 See Cass R. Sunstein, One Case At A Time (1999). 
7 Of course there are many different kinds of minimalism; to say that courts should take small, 
incompletely theorized steps is not to say where they should go. For discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, 
Burkean Minimalism, Mich L Rev (forthcoming 2006). 
8 See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1985); James Fleming, Securing Constitutional Democracy 
(2006). 
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those rules (though any such rules would themselves need to be construed). But the 
document sets out no such rules. It does not say that judges, or others attempting to 
interpret the document, should be Thayerians, originalists, minimalists, perfectionists, or 
something else. For this reason, any approach to the document must be defended by 
reference to some account that is supplied by the interpreter. The Constitution is rightly 
taken as binding, but to this extent, the Constitution must be made rather than found.  
It is possible to go further. Any approach to the founding document must be 
perfectionist in the sense that it attempts to make the document as good as it can possibly 
be. Thayerism is a form of perfectionism; it claims to improve the constitutional order. 
Originalism, read most sympathetically, is a form of perfectionism; it suggests that 
constitutional democracy, properly understood, is best constructed through originalism. 
Minimalism is a form of perfectionism too; it rejects Thayerism and originalism on the 
ground that they would make the constitutional system much worse.9 It would appear that 
the debate among Thayerians, originalists, minimalists, and perfectionists must be waged 
on the perfectionists’ own turf. And if this is so, perfectionists are right to insist that any 
approach to the Constitution must attempt to fit and to justify it. Perhaps the alternatives 
to perfectionism are all, in one or another sense, perfectionist too. 
Some people might resist this conclusion. Pragmatists might not much care about 
“fit”; on one view, consequences are what matter, and a forward-looking approach, 
compromising fit for the sake of good consequences, might well be justified.10 Perhaps 
Thayerians and originalists would compromise fit as well. For some originalists, 
illegitimate precedents, departing from the original understanding, have little standing.11 
But if we understand perfectionism with sufficient capaciousness, its critics are actually 
practionioners too. Pragmatists care deeply about fit, if only for pragmatic reasons; an 
approach to the Constitution that jettisons precedents, or that pays no attention to the 
document itself, would be difficult to defend on pragmatic grounds. Many originalists do 
care about fit with precedents.12 Those who do not, or who are willing to reject 
                                                 
9 See Sunstein, Radicals in Robes, for an elaboration. 
10 See Richard A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy (2002). 
11 See the discussion of Justice Thomas’ views in Sunstein, supra note. 
12 See the discussion of Justice Scalia’s views in id. 
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precedents that they deem illegitimate, certainly care about fit—but what matters is fit 
with the original understanding, not with the decisions that departed from it.  
The ideas of “fit” and “justification” leave many ambiguities. “Fit” with what? 
Justified by reference to what? But if we understand the two ideas broadly enough, all 
reasonable views about constitutional interpretation are perfectionist in character. Even 
those who emphasize occasional or frequent unhappy endings to constitutional 
adjudication, in the form of judicial decisions that produce particular results that they 
abhor, believe that the ultimate ending is good rather than bad, in the sense that it 
produces more in the way of self-government, or legitimacy, or other important values. 
 My basic goal in this Essay is to sketch the argument for second-order 
perfectionism—a form of perfectionism that is alert to institutional limits on the part of 
those who are entrusted with interpreting the founding document. Because of my focus 
on institutional capacities, I shall be focusing throughout on constitutional interpretation 
by the judiciary. From the discussion of Thayerville, Bergerton, and their surrounding 
communities, it should be clear that there is no reason that citizens and their 
representatives should be required to adopt the same method that judges favor.13 On the 
view that I shall be defending, it is possible that citizens will adopt first-order 
perfectionism, while judges will settle on a second-order variety. We might believe, for 
example, that citizens might interpret the Constitution to require states to permit same-
sex marriage, or to ban affirmative action, without thinking that judges should interpret 
the Constitution the same way. Of course it is also possible that citizens do not need 
constitutional ideals, or constitutional text, to pursue their preferred views. Perhaps their 
own ideals will do the trick. 
 
II. On the Very Idea of Interpretation 
 
Does the idea of interpretation, standing by itself, require acceptance of any 
particular approach to the Constitution? Some people believe so.14 To understand second-
order perfectionism and the alternatives, it is necessary to address this question. 
                                                 
13 The idea of constitutional interpretation outside of courts is explored from various angles in James 
Fleming, Securing Constitutional Democracy (2006); Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (1993). 
14 See, e.g., Prakash, Radicals in Tweed Jackets: Why Left-Wing Law Professors Are Wrong for 
America, Colum L Rev (forthcoming 2007). 
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A. Meaning and Intentions 
 
 Perhaps some form of originalism is mandated by the very notion of 
interpretation.15 In ordinary life, we interpret words by asking about the speaker’s 
original intentions. If a friend asks you to meet her at “the best Chinese restaurant in 
town,” you will probably ask what, exactly, she had in mind. You will not ask what 
Chinese restaurant you like best, or which Chinese restaurant is preferred by your favorite 
restaurant critic. Perhaps legal interpretation is not fundamentally different; perhaps some 
form of originalism is built into the concept of interpretation. 
 This idea is tempting but mistaken. When speaker’s intentions are what matters, it 
is for pragmatic reasons, not because of anything inherent in interpretation as a social 
practice. We ask about the intentions of the speaker because and to the extent that the 
goal of communication will go badly, or at least less well, if we do not. When a friend 
asks me to meet her, or to do something for her, I am likely to ask about her intentions, 
because I want to meet her, or to do what she would like. Or consider communication 
within some hierarchical organization. If a supervisor tells an employer what to do, it is 
plausible to think that in ordinary circumstances, the employee ought to ask: “What, 
exactly, did my supervisor mean by that?”16 The employee asks this question, if he does, 
for pragmatic reasons. Employees should generally follow the instructions of their 
supervisors, and the practice of following instructions, in hierarchical organizations, 
usually calls for close attention to subjective intentions. 
But it is easy to think of cases in which interpretation does not operate by 
reference to speaker’s intentions. In fact the most sophisticated originalists contend that 
what matters is the original public meaning, not intentions at all.17 Their interest in the 
original public meaning, as opposed to intentions, is defended on the plausible ground 
that public meaning is objective, not subjective, and that what matters is the standard 
understanding among the Constitution’s ratifiers, not what any authors “intended.” After 
all, the ratifiers, and not the authors, turned the Constitution into law. Of course those 
                                                 
15 Id. 
16 The qualification “in ordinary circumstances” is necessary because even subordinates will 
sometimes ask about something other than speaker’s intentions. Everything depends on the role of the 
subordinate. 
17 See Scalia, supra note. 
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who make this claim insist on originalism, but they do not care about subjective 
intentions. By itself, this understanding of originalism should be enough to show that 
attention to subjective intentions is hardly built into the very idea of interpretation.  
In fact those who emphasize the original meaning tend not to argue that their 
approach is what interpretation necessarily is, but to adopt a form of second-order 
perfectionism.18 They stress the risks associated with judicial discretion; they focus on 
the goal of democratic self-government. Consider the illuminating suggestion by Randy 
Barnett, a committed originalist: “Given a sufficiently good constitutional text, 
originalists maintain that better results will be reached overall if government officials—
including judges—must stick to the original meaning rather than empowering them to 
trump that meaning with one that they prefer.”19 Many originalists contend that their 
preferred approach justifies the Constitution and of course fits with it. And prominent 
originalists are concerned too to show that their approach fits not only with the document 
but also with a great deal of existing doctrine, or at least with those aspects of it that seem 
least dispensable.20 The point is that those who stress original meaning do not contend 
that their approach is built into the very idea of interpretation. 
Indeed, it is perfectly conventional to find domains in which interpretation occurs 
without the slightest reference to either original intentions or original meaning. Suppose 
that the Supreme Court is interpreting a precedent—say, its decision in Lawrence v. 
Texas.21 The Court is most unlikely to ask about the subjective intentions of Justice 
Kennedy, the author of the majority opinion; and it is equally unlikely to inquire into the 
subjective intentions of those who joined the opinion. Perhaps there is no such intention 
with respect to the question at hand; perhaps it is not accessible even if it exists. In any 
case the Court shows no interest in it. Nor will the Court pay attention to the original 
public meaning of its decision (whatever that might mean!). Interpretation of a precedent 
has little to do with original intentions or original meaning. The appropriate conclusion is 
that originalism is one approach to interpretation, but it is merely one. The question is 
whether it is the right one, and that question requires attention not to the concept of 
                                                 
18 See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U Cin L Rev 849 (1989).  
19 Available at http://legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/debateclub_cie0505.msp. 
20 See Akhil Amar, Rethinking Originalism, Slate (2005), available at  
http://www.slate.com/id/2126680/ 
21 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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interpretation but to the consequences of the recommended approach—to whether it 
would make our constitutional order better or worse. 
 
B. Fit and Justification 
 
 Evidently building on judicial approaches to precedents, Ronald Dworkin 
suggests that interpretation requires an effort both to fit and to justify the existing legal 
materials.22 The requirement of “fit” calls for fidelity to the material that is being 
interpreted. The requirement of justification means that when more than one possibility 
“fits,” the judge must bring forward what seems to be the best principle that accounts for 
the existing materials. Dworkin believes that the ideas of fit and justification—captured 
in his notion of “integrity”—capture the nature of interpretation in many domains.23 
Dworkin may even believe that as a social practice, interpretation is a search for integrity 
in his sense. Strongly influenced by Dworkin, James Fleming offers a similar 
understanding in his illuminating and impressive book on constitutional interpretation.24 I 
shall turn to Fleming’s particular arguments shortly; for the moment, let us consider the 
ideas of fit and justification in connection with first-order and second-order 
perfectionism. 
 Suppose that a nation—say, Iraq—has ratified a constitutional provision that 
forbids any denial of “equality under the law on the basis of sex.” Suppose that the 
government adopts a height and weight requirement for its security forces and that the 
requirement turns out to have a disproportionate adverse effect on women. Suppose, 
finally, that if the government is forced to justify the height and weight requirement on 
grounds of job-relatedness, it will not find it easy to do so. If the requirement is 
challenged as a denial of “equality under the law,” what should the Court do? 
 On Dworkin’s view, the Court must give a “moral reading” to the constitutional 
provision, in the sense that the Court should generate the best moral principle that 
accounts for it.25 Offhand, we might imagine a reading that restricts the clause to facial 
discrimination (call this the “antidiscrimination” principle); we might also imagine a 
                                                 
22 See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1985). 
23 See id. 
24 See James Fleming, Securing Constitutional Democracy (2006). 
25 See Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (2001). 
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reading that calls on government to account for itself whenever it has imposed a 
distinctive burden on women (call this the “anticaste” principle). Dworkin’s characteristic 
style is to identify at least two opposing principles and to suggest that because one is 
better, the Court ought to choose it.26 But consider another possibility. Perhaps the Court 
might prefer the anticaste principle as a matter of abstract theory, believing that it makes 
better sense of the guarantee of equality under the law. But at the same time, the Court 
might select the antidiscrimination principle, on the ground that it ensures that judges will 
not be forced to undertake inquiries for which they are ill-suited. The Court might believe 
that judgments about whether a requirement is sufficiently job-related are extremely 
burdensome; it might also believe that if judges attempt to make such judgments, they 
will often blunder. In this respect, judges might conclude that the equality guarantee is 
properly underenforced by the judiciary; and they might adopt the antidiscrimination 
principle for that reason. 
 If courts reason in this way, are they attempting both to fit and to justify our 
(legal) practices? In one sense, the answer is clear: They are. But even in this mundane 
example, their perfectionism is second-order, not first-order. They are refusing to adopt 
the morally preferred account of equality, simply because of a sense of their own 
fallibility.27  
Now imagine that the government has argued not only that the antidiscrimination 
account is the better one, but also that the Court should uphold sex discrimination so long 
as it is minimally rational. For the equality guarantee, the government argues that the 
Court should proceed as it would in Thayerville. In my view, that would be an 
unfortunate reading of an equality guarantee, because it would undermine that guarantee 
so severely, and because most nations, including contemporary Iraq, are not Thayerville. 
But in the end, that view must also be sensitive to institutional capacities, and it must be 
defended with close reference to them. Suppose that judges, deciding sex equality cases, 
would produce worse-than-random decisions. If so, we may be in Thayerville, and 
perhaps the rational basis test would be desirable after all. 
                                                 
26 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, How to Read the Civil Rights Act, in A Matter of Principle 316 (1985). 
27 Fleming, unlike Dworkin, agrees that some constitutional protections are underenforced by the 
judiciary, and properly so. Fleming, supra note, at 215.  
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To be a bit more formal: An approach to the Constitution might impose two kinds 
of costs. It might impose decision costs, and it might impose error costs. Without making 
the ludicrous claim that these ideas should be understood in economic terms, we can 
insist that judges do well to consider the decisional burdens of one or another approach to 
the founding document. Those burdens, or costs, might be faced by judges or by others, 
including legislators, members of the executive branch, and citizens themselves, who 
must pay the cost of uncertainty. A Thayerian approach to the Constitution would 
certainly impose low decision costs. But it is also important to consider the number and 
the magnitude of errors. If judges uphold sex discrimination whenever it is rational, they 
would (in my view) permit a large number of serious errors; and it is for this reason that 
in the United States, the rational basis test would make no sense in the domain of sex 
discrimination. We may be in Smallville; we may be in Olympus. But we are certainly 
not in Bergerton or Thayerville. 
The broader point is that no approach to interpretation is dictated by the very idea 
of interpretation. Originalism is certainly a candidate; it cannot be rejected on a priori 
grounds. The problem with originalism is that it would make the American system of 
constitutional law much worse than it now is.28 I believe that while the question is closer, 
the same is true for Thayerism. Whatever one’s judgment about the particulars, some 
form of perfectionism is inevitable. It is important to fit our practices; it is also important 
to make sense out of them.29 But in my view, minimalism, as a form of second-order 
perfectionism, is far better than the first-order variety. 
 
III. Deliberative Democracy and Deliberative Autonomy 
 
To understand these various claims, and the limits of first-order perfectionism, I 
now turn to the instructive recent discussion by James Fleming.30 Fleming offers a careful 
and sustained account of what, in his view, constitutional perfectionism requires. One of 
the many virtues of his book is the unabashed quality of his version of perfectionism. As 
he understands the Constitution, it does in fact guarantee “happy endings,” and there is 
                                                 
28 See Sunstein, Radicals in Robes, supra note. 
29 In so saying, I am not endorsing Dworkin’s particular understanding of fit and justification. 
30 See Fleming, supra note. 
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nothing wrong with that fact.31 If our goal is to fit and to justify our practices, why should 
we settle for unhappy endings? The second-order perfectionist has an answer, but that 
answer ensures that the ending is not quite unhappy, despite some bad bumps along the 
way. The first-order perfectionist seeks to avoid the bumps. 
Designed under the evident influence of John Rawls, Fleming’s form of 
perfectionism is emphatically first-order. He believes that courts should protect 
deliberative democracy by securing its preconditions, which entail both reflection and 
accountability. More controversially, Fleming believes that courts should protect 
deliberative autonomy by protecting a robust right of self-determination. The latter right 
is “underwritten” by liberty of conscience and freedom of association, though it is not 
limited to them.32 A more general claim is that we should attempt “to give full meaning 
to our constitution of principle, a covenant of aspirations and ideals that guarantee the 
promise of liberty and that must survive more ages than one.”33 As a way of investigating 
this form of perfectionism, I shall focus on Fleming’s claims on behalf of deliberative 
autonomy, exploring deliberative democracy largely by way of comparison.34 
 
A. Deliberative Autonomy 
 
As Fleming describes it, the idea of deliberative autonomy “tends to expand the 
categories of protected significant decisions and thus to protect virtually all decisions that 
persons might make in exercising their capacity for a conception of the good.”35 Properly 
understood, deliberative autonomy does not require libertarianism, in the form of a full-
scale attack on the regulatory state; indeed, it “does not justify special judicial protection 
of economic liberties.”36 But it does protect the right of gays and lesbians to engage in 
intimate association, evidently on the ground that heterosexual intimate association 
                                                 
31 Id. at 210-15. 
32 Fleming, supra note, at 106. 
33 Id. at 127. 
34 Sunstein, supra note, emphasizes an approach to the Constitution rooted in deliberative democracy; I 
do not exactly repudiate the approach there, but I believe that the discussion would have been better if it 
had grappled with the theory-building limitations of the federal judiciary, and explored whether and to what 
extent a minimalist approach to interpretation might, in the end, fit with one rooted in the ideal of 
deliberative democracy.  
35 Fleming, supra note, at 131.  
36 Id. at 135.  
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receives similar protection.37 More generally, deliberative autonomy calls for “liberty of 
conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of association, including both expressive 
association and intimate association, whatever one’s sexual orientation; the right to live 
with one’s family, whether nuclear or extended; the right to travel or relocate; the right to 
marry; the right to decide whether to bear or beget a children, including the rights to 
procreate, to use contraceptives, and to terminate a pregnancy; the right to direct the 
education and rearing of children; and the right to exercise dominion over one’s body, 
including the right to bodily integrity and ultimately the right to die.”38 
To evaluate Fleming’s proposal, we need to ask at the outset: What is the textual 
source of deliberative autonomy? The first amendment provides an evident textual 
foundation for “liberal of conscience and freedom of thought,” and also for “freedom of 
association,” at least of certain kinds. Insofar as people are attempting to speak on 
political questions or to associate for political purposes, their rights seem constitutionally 
secure as a textual matter. If a theoretically ambitious account is required, the idea of 
deliberative democracy, which certainly has historical roots in the founding period,39 is 
enough; we need not speak of autonomy at all. Protection of some forms of speech may, 
however, be difficult to defend by reference to deliberative democracy alone. 
Nonpolitical literature, for example, might be best understood by reference to deliberative 
autonomy rather than deliberative democracy, and here existing understandings of free 
speech certainly fit with Fleming’s concerns. The text of the first amendment refers to 
“freedom of speech,” not “freedom of political speech,” and hence an idea of autonomy, 
with respect to speech, is not textually out of bounds.40 
But let us put speech to one side. Insofar as Fleming is stressing autonomy rights 
outside of the domain of the first amendment, most of his catalogue of rights must be 
defended by reference to the due process clause, not the first amendment.41 It should be 
unnecessary to emphasize that it is a large textual stretch to use the due process clause to 
protect deliberative autonomy, because the clause speaks in terms of process alone. The 
                                                 
37 Id. at 137.  
38 Id. at 11. 
39 See William Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason (1985). 
40 Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (1993), defends a two-tier conception 
of free speech, placing political speech in a preferred position. 
41 I put to one side the question whether the privileges and immunities clause provides a more secure 
home for autonomy rights. 
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textual awkwardness of “substantive due process” casts a large and dark shadow over 
ambitious efforts to protect autonomy in general. On the other hand, some form of 
substantive due process is an established part of existing law,42 and so long as existing 
law is accepted, the textual stretch is not a decisive objection to Fleming’s proposal.  
But it is easy to imagine two kinds of challenges to that proposal, based on first-
order and second-order perfectionism respectively. My major concern is the latter. I 
spend some time on the former not to show that Fleming is wrong on first-order grounds, 
but to pave the way toward a second-order alternative. 
 
B. Internal Challenges 
 
The first-order challenge could take various forms. Fleming purports to build 
directly on established law—to defend it far more than to revise it. But suppose that we 
seek “to protect virtually all decisions that persons might make in exercising their 
capacity for a conception of the good.” If so, it is most unlikely that we would single out, 
for special protection, the particular set of interests that Fleming has catalogued. Most of 
those interests would be strong candidates for inclusion, but the list would be much 
longer, and it is doubtful that all of those mentioned by Fleming would come near the top. 
If deliberative autonomy is involved, Fleming’s catalogue seems both over-
inclusive and under-inclusive. Some sex acts are not simple to understand in terms of 
“deliberative” autonomy; some such acts are impulsive, not deliberative. Does Fleming 
mean to exclude one-night stands, or one-afternoon stands, or a one-shot visit to a 
prostitute from the ambit of his proposal? If not, deliberation might not be at the heart of 
his claims after all. More fundamentally, his list of protected interests seems far too 
narrow, at least if we focus on the ideal of deliberative autonomy, protecting decisions 
made as people exercise “their capacity for a conception of the good.” Imagine that 
people want to ride motorcycles without helmets or cars without seatbelts; that they 
would like to use heroin, marijuana, or LSD; that they seek a medical treatment 
unauthorized by the Food and Drug Administration; that they would like to work more 
hours than is permitted by the Fair Labor Standards Act; that they would like to be 
prostitutes or drug-dealers; that they would like to clone themselves or their children. Or 
                                                 
42 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 558 (2003). 
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imagine that people would like to have a chance to enter some profession. Perhaps they 
would like to be debt-adjusters, even without a law degree.43 Perhaps they would like to 
be interior designers, and government is standing in their way with a restriction that is 
evidently arbitrary or at least weakly justified.44  
To be sure, it is possible that third-party effects provide a sufficient answer to 
some of these claims; perhaps the interest in autonomy is overridden because of the 
effects of free choices on those who are affected by them. But such effects are most 
unlikely to provide an adequate answer in all or even many of these cases. We might well 
conclude that people who assert these rights—and many others—are deliberating and 
attempting to implement their conception of the good. Does Fleming seek to protect them 
as well? If not, an explanation needs to be offered.45 If so, the idea of deliberative 
autonomy might well seem to have (unacceptably?) radical implications.  
On a plausible view, the Constitution would be made worse, not better, with the 
judicial protection of “all decisions that persons might make in exercising their capacity 
for a conception of the good.” Suppose, for example, that protection of the right to 
physician-assisted suicide would lead many people to choose death not after sufficiently 
considered reflection, but as a result of intense, short-term fears and anxieties. If so, there 
is a plausible argument that such a right should not exist, because it is not in the interest 
of the very people on behalf of whose autonomy it is created.46 Suppose that this 
argument is rejected. Even so, it remains possible that if the relevant right is created, it 
will operate in practice to give doctors, not patients, the authority to make decisions about 
life and death.47 If this empirical prediction turns out to be right, there are serious 
problem with creating the right to physician-assisted suicide from the perfectionist point 
of view.  
                                                 
43 See Ferguson v. Scrupa, 372 US 726 (1963). 
44 See http://www.ij.org/economic_liberty/nm_interiordesign/index.html 
45 Fleming does contend that his approach does not require a general libertarian principle, Securing 
Constitutional Democracy, supra note, at 134-37, but there is certainly an overlap between the two is 
approaches, and I am not sure that he has successfully separated them. He urges that paternalistic laws, of 
the sort disfavored by libertarians, “typically do not implicate the concerns of the antitotalitarian principle 
of liberty r infringe on significant basic liberties.” Id. at 136. But why not? 
46 Herbert Hendin, Seduced By Death (1996). 
47 Id. 
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The example could easily be generalized. Many decisions that people “make in 
exercising their capacity for a conception of the good” turn out not to promote, but 
instead to undermine, their own well-being.48 A detailed literature investigates failures in 
“affective forecasting,” as when people misjudge the effects of their decisions on their 
own lives.49 Constitutional protection of decisions produced by “miswanting,”50 in the 
form of choices that do not improve people’s welfare, would not seem to be in the 
interest of the people whose decisions are at stake.  
Fleming believes that the Constitution protects the right to marry. But what, 
exactly, does this mean? On one account of deliberative autonomy, adults should be 
permitted to marry their cousins or their siblings, or perhaps their parents, or to have 
multiple spouses. Is the right to polygamy guaranteed by the right to deliberative 
autonomy? On perfectionist grounds, it would be possible to worry that any such right 
would turn out harm the interests of some or many people—including, perhaps, many 
women and children. Perhaps Fleming would conclude that the right to marry is properly 
limited to two adults, and that the ban on incestuous marriages is consistent with the basic 
principle, properly conceived. But if the underlying concern is deliberative autonomy, 
why, exactly, is this limitation justified? 
I do not contend that the ideal of deliberative autonomy has no roots in 
constitutional traditions. Nor do I deny that as a matter of principle, Fleming’s account of 
autonomy has considerable appeal. In Olympus, a judge might well accept an account of 
that general kind. The question is whether the interest in deliberative autonomy, as 
Fleming understands it, might have far broader implications than is indicated by 
Fleming’s catalogue of protected rights. Fortunately, Fleming’s own catalogue is largely 
anchored on settled law51—a point to which I will return. But as compared to settled law, 
the idea of deliberative autonomy has a great deal of generality and ambition; and it 
might end up leading to outcomes that would make the Constitution less perfect, not 
more so. 
                                                 
48 Daniel T. Gilbert and T.D. Wilson, Miswanting, in Thinking and Feeling: The Role of Affect in 
Social Cognition 178 (Joseph P. Forgas ed.) (2000); Timothy D. Wilson and Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective 
Forecasting, 35 Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 345 (June 2003). 
49 See id. 
50 Id.  
51 Fleming, supra note, at 92. 
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C. External Challenges: Second-Order Perfectionism 
 
I raise these points not to settle them, but to emphasize a different kind of 
objection. Suppose that we believe that federal judges are poorly equipped to set out the 
ingredients of autonomy, deliberative or otherwise. Suppose that we believe that they are 
likely to blunder—that if they ask about the nature of autonomy in the abstract, they will 
protect interests that ought not to be protected, and refuse to protect interests that 
emphatically deserve protection. Some people might fear, for example, that judges are 
likely to find commercial advertising to be central to autonomy, rightly conceived, or that 
they will provide undue protection to campaign contributions, or that they will strike 
down minimum wage and maximum hour legislation. (If this catalogue does not seem 
especially fearful, it would be easy to produce a catalogue that would.) No one should be 
surprised by the suggestion that if judges are unleashed to strike down legislation by 
reference to the idea of “deliberative autonomy,” they might well blunder. Outside of 
Olympus, there is no guarantee that real-world judges, trained and fallible as they are, 
will be able to execute Fleming’s project in a way that Fleming or anyone else would 
approve. If we are concerned about the costs of decisions and the costs of error, in any 
imaginable form, first-order perfectionism, founded in high ideals, loses some of its 
appeal.  
 Recall here the suggestion that originalism might produce the best overall 
consequences.52 To evaluate that suggestion, we need to know something about 
institutions; we also have to know something about political morality. Suppose that 
originalism, rightly understood, would greatly limit the powers of the national 
government, eliminate the right of privacy, strengthen the protection of property and gun 
owners, and allow the national and state governments to discriminate on the basis of sex. 
(I am not contending that originalism necessarily would have these consequences.) If so, 
is the argument for originalism strengthened or weakened? That question cannot be 
answered without asking whether and to what extent the relevant results are good or bad. 
We can therefore see that disputes about interpretive approaches have a great deal to do 
not only with institutional capacities also with moral evaluations of the relevant results. A 
central objection to originalism is that it would, in fact, produce morally unacceptable 
                                                 
52 See Barnett, supra note. 
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outcomes; the same objection seems to me plausibly made against Thayerism as well. I 
believe that an approach like Fleming’s (and Dworkin’s as well) would greatly strain 
judicial capacities, and that in some cases, it would produce results that are questionable 
from the moral point of view.  
Let me offer a simple suggestion in this light. As Fleming shows, our 
constitutional doctrine is now committed to certain forms of autonomy. Whether these 
are deliberative forms, and whether they are best understood by reference to a broader 
right to exercise one’s capacities for a conception of the good, might be debated. But 
there is no question that in specified domains, government may not intrude on people’s 
choices without an exceedingly strong justification. In Smallville, judges value stability 
and distrust their own capacity to rethink established law from the ground up. Hence they 
are convinced that they should build on these decisions through rulings that are both 
narrow and theoretically unambitious (to the extent possible53). Because the abstraction 
of “deliberative autonomy” is so difficult to handle, the judges of Smallville do not want 
to march under its banner. They fear that an abstraction of that kind will lead to undue 
confusion and error. Because they are not too sure that they are right, they proceed by 
reference to low-level principles that seem at once more manageable and less 
contentious.54 
Here is another way to put the point. Heavily influenced by John Rawls, Fleming 
wants to secure the conditions for free and equal citizenship.55 Rawls’ own approach to 
political philosophy seeks to put to one side the great questions in metaphysics and 
general philosophy, in a way that “leaves philosophy as it is.”56 (In a wonderful footnote 
in an unpublished manuscript, Rawls writes: “We post a sign: No deep thinking here. 
Things are bad enough already.”) The goal of political liberalism, as opposed to 
comprehensive liberalism, is to bracket foundational disputes about human nature, the 
good, and the like, and to seek general commitments on which diverse people can 
converge from their different starting points. Minimalists are sympathetic to this goal, but 
                                                 
53 Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (2006), rightly insists that judges might have to think fairly 
ambitiously to resolve hard cases 
54 For this reason, Edward Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (1949), with its emphasis on 
“reasoning by example,” continues to offer useful guidance about legal reasoning in the constitutional 
domain. 
55 See, e.g., Fleming, supra note, at 14.  
56 See John Rawls, Reply to Habermas, 92 J Phil 132, 134 (1995). 
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they attempt to go one step further. They seek incompletely theorized agreements—
particular judgments and low-level rationales that people can accept notwithstanding their 
disagreements or uncertainties about foundational questions.57 In short, minimalists want 
to leave political philosophy as it is—to bracket, whenever possible,58 controversies over 
the right form of liberalism, or even between liberalism and its adversaries.  
For minimalists, the problem with the ideal of deliberative autonomy is that it 
extends far beyond the decided cases, and requires judges to ask questions that they are 
not well-suited to answer. Minimalists do not reject that ideal, but they are not prepared 
to endorse it. Their commitment to second-order perfectionism prevents them from doing 
so, on the ground that endorsement of such an ideal threatens to make constitutional law 
worse rather than better. 
 
Conclusion 
 
My main goal in this Essay has been to suggest the appeal of second-order 
perfectionism—an approach to constitutional interpretation that recognizes the limitations 
of the federal judiciary, especially in the domain of political and moral reasoning. We 
should be willing to agree that in some sense, interpreters of the document have duties of 
both fit and justification. Where the requirement of fit leaves several possibilities, judges 
have to think about what approach would be best. Judgments of political morality are in 
that sense an indispensable part of any view about how to interpret the Constitution. The 
arguments for and against originalism, and for and against Thayerism, must pay 
considerable attention to the results that they would generate, and hence those with 
different evaluative positions will offer different judgments about those results. If 
originalism and Thayerism would permit racial segregation or sex discrimination, how 
strongly, exactly, does that fact count against the two approaches?  
If the goal is to perfect the Constitution, neither originalism nor Thayerism can 
easily be ruled out of bounds, at least if we attend to the fallibility of judges; both can be 
understood as forms of second-order perfectionism. In some possible worlds, originalism 
is best; Thayerism is best in others. Minimalist approaches also embody a form of 
                                                 
57 See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (1996). 
58 But see Dworkin, supra note. 
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second-order perfectionism. And if all this is right, it remains possible to argue that first-
order perfectionism makes sense for political participants and their representatives, even 
if judges should be more firmly constrained. 
On its face, the idea of a “moral reading” of the Constitution is ambiguous. That 
idea could call by case-by-case judgments about what morality requires, constrained by 
the existing legal materials.59 Alternatively, it could accommodate an approach, itself 
justified on grounds of political morality, that forbids or sharply disciplines those 
judgments. Certainly it cannot be shown, by reference to the abstract ideas of fit and 
justification, that second-order perfectionism is inferior to first-order varieties. On the 
contrary, it is not obviously false to say that a form of minimalism, at least in the most 
difficult cases, fits our practices and also justifies them. 
The ideal of deliberative democracy can be specified in different ways, and if we 
believe that judges are unlikely to make sensible specifications, we might be skeptical 
about the suggestion that the Constitution should be construed in light of that ideal. In my 
view, however, American judges tend to do well, at least in hard cases, when they 
approach the Constitution’s general phrases with reference to deliberative democracy.60 
The question of institutional capacity is different when judges are attempting to give 
content to the ideal of “autonomy,” even if we disregard the apparently procedural 
character of the due process clause. To be sure, the ideal of autonomy is not undisciplined 
in the domain of speech and religion, where it can be cabined by reference to both settled 
law and widely shared intuitions. But for “liberty” in general, reasonable people can and 
do disagree, more than vigorously, about what autonomy ought to be taken to entail. For 
judges, an effort to protect autonomy, or deliberative autonomy, would impose serious 
decisional burdens, and in the end it is not at all clear that American democracy would be 
better as a result.  
With respect to autonomy, I have suggested that judges do best, if they can, to 
build narrowly from previous rulings, in a way that avoids theoretical abstractions. Of 
course it is true that in hard cases, a degree of theoretical ambition will become 
inevitable. It is also true that a number of decisions now protect autonomy of one or 
                                                 
59 This seems to me the direction indicated by Dworkin, Freedom’s Law, supra note. 
60 An argument to this general effect can be found in Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty (2006). 
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another sort, and current controversies must pay close attention to those decisions. But 
where there is no problem from the standpoint of self-government, and no unjustifiable 
inequality, I believe that judges should usually give democratic processes the benefit of 
the reasonable doubt. However that may be, the largest point remains: Any approach to 
constitutional interpretation must pay close attention to the problem of judicial fallibility, 
and for that reason, second-order perfectionism has a great deal of appeal.  
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